

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN, GE11 ECJ4/7-SA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 KUWAIT 4143

DEPT. PASS AID ALSO ACDA WASHDC

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, KU
SUBJECT: INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE (IASA)

REF: (A) STATE 167901 (DTG 010215Z JUL 78), (B) STATE
168320 (DTG 031928Z JUL 78), (C) USCINCEUR)71545Z JUL 78,
(D) USCINCEUR 131635Z JUL 78.

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFS A THROUGH D, THE FOLLOWING
REPORT FOR KUWAIT IS SUBMITTED. PARAGRAPHS REFER TO REQ-
UIREMENTS STATED REF A.

2. REF PARA 3.A.1: DESCRIPTION OF US INTERESTS AND SPECIFIC
SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES.

A. US STRATEGIC INTERESTS: KUWAIT'S IMPORTANCE TO THE
UNITED STATES IS VERY LARGELY A FUNCTION OF ITS LARGE OIL
AND FINANCIAL RESERVES. THE LATTER HAS ENABLED KUWAIT TO GAIN
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER DISPROPORTIONATE TO ITS SIZE AND
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POPULATION. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE US GOVERNMENT THAT
THIS POWER NOT BE USED IN A MANNER WHICH IS INIMICAL TO US
INTERESTS. PRESERVATION OF KUWAIT AS AN INDEPENDENT,
MODERATE, FREE-ENTERPRISE SOPDETY, HAVING A STRONG SENSE OF
SHARING OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS WITH THE US, STRENGTHENS
RESISTANCE TO SUCH USE OF KUWAITI ASSETS.
B. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES).

(1) TO ASSIST IN MAINTAINING A STABLE, INDEPENDENT KUWAITI GOVERNMENT FREE OF COMMUNIST OR RADICAL ARAB CONTROL AND DEVOTED TO DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

(2) TO ASSIST IN ASSURING AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH KUWAITI OIL WOULD BE AVAILABLE AT REASONABLE PRICES TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES.

(3) TO ENCOURAGE ACQUISITION AND RETENTION OF PERSONNEL FRIENDLY TO THE WEST AS KUWAIT'S MILITARY ADVISERS.

(4) TO SUPPLY APPROPRIATE WESTERN DEFENSIVE MILITARY EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO MEET KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.

(5) TO INSPIRE RESPECT FOR AND EMULATION OF US CONCEPTS OF THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A SOCIETY GOVERNED BY CIVILIANS, AND TO FOSTER PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN KUWAITIS AND AMERICANS.

3. REF PARA 3.A.2: STATEMENT OF THE THREAT BOTH EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PERCEIVED BY THE HOST COUNTRY AND THE COUNTRY'S STRATEGIES TO MEET THE THREAT:

A. THREAT: IRAQ THREATENED TO TAKE OVER KUWAIT UPON ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM THE UK IN 1961 AND SINCE THAT TIME THERE HAVE BEEN BORDER INCURSIONS, MOST RECENTLY IN 1976. IRAQ CLAIMS ALL OR PART OF THE KUWAITI OWNED ISLANDS OF BUBIYAN AND WARBAH, LARGELY BECAUSE THESE ISLANDS BORDER ON IRAQ'S OUTLET TO THE PERSIAN GULF FROM ITS MAJOR PORT
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OF UMM QASR. RECENTLY, RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT HAVE IMPROVED, BUT THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF CONTROL OVER THE ISLANDS AND A FINAL DEFINITION OF THE BORDER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED.

B. EVENTS SINCE EARLY 1978 HAVE REDUCED GOK PERCEPTION OF IRAQ AS AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO KUWAITI TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, BUT HAVE PROBABLY NOT ALTERED GOK'S UNDERSTANDING OF STILL IDEOLOGICALLY HOSTILE IRAQ. KEY KUWAITI LEADERS HAVE AT THE SAME TIME PROBABLY COME TO PERCEIVE INTERNATIONAL LEFTIST THREATS TO STABILITY OF GULF STATES AS A DANGER MORE REAL AND IMMINENT THAN IT WAS.

C. STRATEGY TO COUNTER THREAT: GOK RECOGNIZES THAT THE OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY OF IRAQI FORCES PRECLUDES PROLONGED HIGH-INTENSITY COMBAT ENGAGEMENTS. IN VIEW OF THIS, GOK IS BUILDING A MULTIFACETED ARMED FORCE WHOSE MISSION IS TO HALT TEMPORARILY AN IRAQI MILITARY INCURSION AND DELAY SUCH FORCES UNTIL POLITICAL/MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM IRAN, OTHER ARAB STATES, AND/OR WESTERN POWERS AND THE UNITED NATIONS COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON INVADING FORCES.

4. REF PARA 3.A.3: MISSION'S PERCEPTION OF THREAT:

A. CONCUR IN GENERAL WITH PERCEPTION OF IRAQ AS SOLE

SHORT-TERM MILITARY THREAT. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF RECENT
LEFTIST/MARXIST GAINS IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES OF THE AREA
AS A WHOLE, EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT GOK HAS BASIS FOR
GREATER CONCERN REGARDING THE POTENTIAL FOR SUCH DEVELOPMENTS
IN KUWAIT THAN IS INDICATED BY OFFICIAL GOK REACTION
COMMUNICATED TO EMBASSY TO DATE.

5. REF PARA 2.A.4: TYPE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HOST
COUNTRY BELIEVES BEST SUITED TO MEET THE THREAT:
A. THE GOK IS IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING A SMALL
REGULAR AND READY RESERVE FORCE ARMED WITH THE MOST MODERN
MILITARY EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE TO THEM. ALTHOUGH SOME OF
THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS COULD BE EMPLOYED IN AN OFFENSIVE ROLE,
THE FORCE STRUCTURE IS DEFENSIVE IN NATURE, AND IT WOULD BE
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MOST IMPROBABLE FOR THE GOK TO CHOOSE TO ATTACK ANY OF ITS
NEIGHBORS. (THE GOK HAS, HOWEVER, DEPLOYED A SMALL FORCE IN
EACH OF THE 1967 AND 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICTS IN CON-
JUNCTION WITH OTHER ARAB FORCES.) IN GENERAL TERMS, THESE
FORCES WILL CONSIST OF:

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- (1) 2 MECHANIZED INFANTRY BRIGADES
- (2) 1 ARMORED BRIGADE
- (3) 4 SEPARATE SUPPORT BATTALIONS
- (4) 2 A-4 ATTACK SQUADRONS (18 U/E)
- (5) 1 MIRAGE F-1 INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON (20 U/E)
- (6) 2 HELICOPTER SQUADRONS
- (7) 1 TRANSPORT SQUADRON (C-130 AND C-9)
- (8) 1 I HAWK SAM BATTALION
- (9) 1 STRELLA SAM BATTALION
- (10) 1 GROG SSM BATTALION
- (11) 1 AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BATTALION (PROBABLY EMERAD 30MM)

B. THE GOK HAS ALSO INDICATED A DESIRE TO ESTABLISH A SMALL COASTAL DEFENSE FORCE. THIS FORCE WILL PROBABLY CONSIST OF APPROXIMATELY 10 PATROL-TYPE CRAFT. HOWEVER, NO DETAILED COMMITMENT AS TO TYPES OR NUMBERS HAS BEEN MADE.

6. REF PARA 3.A.5: ASSESSMENT OF THESE FORCES IN RELATION TO US INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES:
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A. US INTERESTS: THE FORCES LISTED PRECEDING PARAGRAPH POSE NO SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO US INTERESTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AS AN AUGMENTATION FORCE TO A UNITED ARAB EFFORT IN A FUTURE CRISIS, THE MAGNITUDE OF EQUIPMENT PRESENTLY ON HAND OR PROGRAMMED WOULD ADD VERY LITTLE TO THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF THE FORCES WHICH COULD BE EMPLOYED BY EGYPT, JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ AND OTHER POTENTIAL ALLIES IN A COMBINED ARAB MILITARY EFFORT.

B. US INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES: THE USG HAS THE POTENTIAL TO USE TERMINATION OF SUPPLY/TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS AS A LEVER IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOK. THIS LEVERAGE WOULD NOT EXIST WERE KUWAIT TO PURCHASE MILITARY HARDWARE FROM OTHER THAN US SOURCES. ADDITIONALLY, THE FOSTERING OF CORDIAL BILATERAL RELATIONS REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 ABOVE IS SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED BY THE PRESENCE OF US ADVISORY PERSONNEL IN KUWAIT AND BY THE EXTENSIVE EXPOSURE OF OVER 2000 MEMBERS OF THE KUWAIT ARMED FORCES WHO SPEND EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME IN THE UNITED STATES ATTENDING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TRAINING COURSES. SINCE THE VAST MAJORITY OF WEAPONS AND RELATED SUPPORT PLANNED BY THE GOK HAVE ALREADY BEEN NEGOTIATED, THE ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO USG RELATIVE TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE ARE LIMITED. IT IS THE OPINION OF EMBASSY THAT THE ONLY VIABLE COURSE OF ACTION IS TO MEET COMMITMENTS ALREADY MADE AND TO VIEW FUTURE REQUESTS FOR S.A. IN LIGHT OF CONDITIONS EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE REQUEST.

7. REF PARA 3.A.6: ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE ECONOMY OF KUWAIT (PROJECTIONS):

	FY80	FY81	FY82
GNP (\$ BILLIONS)	18.3	20.6	23.1
DEFENSE EFFORT (\$ MILLIONS)	715	725	735
PERCENT OF GNP	3.9	3.5	3.2

PURCHASE OF US DEFENSE ITEMS
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(\$ MILLIONS) 114.3 131.4 75.4

A. ANALYSIS:

(1) ALTHOUGH TOTAL BUDGET INFORMATION FOR THE STATE OF KUWAIT IS NOT AVAILABLE, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES WILL CONSTITUTE A SMALL PORTION OF GNP AND WILL HAVE VIRTUALLY NO IMPACT ON THE ABILITY OF THE GOK TO CONTINUE LARGE-SCALE EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC SERVICES (HOUSING, HEALTH CARE, EDUCATION, ETC.). IN FACT, IT IS BELIEVED THAT LARGE SURPLUSES WILL CONTINUE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

(2) ANY ESTIMATES OF FUTURE NON-MILITARY IMPORTS FOR KUWAIT SHOULD BE QUESTIONED. IN THE PAST FEW YEARS IMPORTS HAVE RISEN AT THE RATE OF 40 PERCENT TO 50 PERCENT PER YEAR; THIS RATE CANNOT BE SUSTAINED INDEFINITELY. IF FUTURE IMPORTS ARE ONLY AT THE PRESENT LEVEL, MILITARY IMPORTS DURING FY 80 WOULD CONSTITUTE ONLY 3.4 PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS. IF THEY CONTINUE TO INCREASE, MILITARY IMPORTS, AS A PORTION OF TOTAL IMPORTS, WILL BE EVEN LESS.

(3) WITH OVER \$30 BILLION IN FOREIGN ASSETS KUWAIT IS NOT EXPECTED TO HAVE ANY FOREIGN EXCHANGE OR DEBT SERVICING PROBLEMS FOR THE NEXT DECADE AND BEYOND.

8. REF PARA 3.A.7-8-AND 9: IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIRECTIVES CONTAINED IN REF D, REFERENCE IS MADE TO DATA SUBMITTED IN KUWAIT FY 80-84 MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROJECTION (MSAP).

9. REF PARA 3.A.10: ARMS CONTROL IMPACT OF EACH MAJOR PROPOSED SALE: THE TYPES OF EQUIPMENT PROJECTED FOR PURCHASES DURING FY 1980-1982 ARE TO A LARGE EXTENT DEFENSIVE IN NATURE. THE HAWK MISSILE BATTALION, TOW MISSILES, AND TRUCKS PROGRAMMED FOR PURCHASE DURING THIS PERIOD WILL NOT INTRODUCE A NEW OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY INTO THIS REGION NOR WILL THE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE WEAPONS APPRECIABLY ALTER THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER.

10. REF PARA 3.A.11: HUMAN RIGHTS:
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A. KUWAIT IS AMONG THE MORE PROGRESSIVE COUNTRIES IN THE

MIDDLE EAST IN PROVIDING CIVIL RIGHTS AND PROMOTING THE SOCIAL WELFARE OF ITS CITIZENS. ARBITRARY ARREST AND/OR IMPRISONMENT ARE PROHIBITED AND WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS ARE NOT SANCTIONED BY THE GOVERNMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, SEVERAL LABOR UNIONISTS WHO OBJECTED PUBLICLY TO THE 1976 PARTIAL SUSPENSION OF THE CONSTITUTION WERE DETAINED BRIEFLY AND RELEASED.

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B. THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF KUWAIT PROVIDES FOR PUBLIC TRIAL, RIGHT OF APPEAL AND LEGAL REPRESENTATION. ON RARE OCCASIONS ALIENS WITH RADICAL POLITICAL VIEWS ARE DEPORTED WITHOUT JUDICIAL PROCESS. EMBASSY HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST INVASION OF THE HOME.

C. GOK HAS INSTITUTED WIDE-RANGING PROGRAMS TO PROVIDE ITS CITIZENS JOBS, HOUSING, MEDICAL CARE AND EDUCATION.

D. KUWAITIS AND OTHER RESIDENTS ARE GENERALLY FREE TO SPEAK AS THEY WISH. NEWSPAPERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CENSORSHIP PRIOR TO PUBLICATION, BUT THEY ARE SUBJECT TO SUSPENSION FOR VIOLATION OF LAWS REGARDING POLITICAL CONTENT. THESE LAWS USE PHRASES SUCH AS "SPREAD DISSENSION", "INVOLVED IN POLITICAL MATTERS" AND "CONTRADICT THE NATIONAL INTEREST" TO DESCRIBE THE GROUNDS FOR SUCH SUSPENSIONS.

E. KUWAIT RECOGNIZES FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, BUT THE PERMISSION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IS REQUIRED FOR RALLIES OR DEMON-

STRATIONS. EMBASSY DOES NOT KNOW THE NUMBER OF SUCH REQUESTS FOR PERMISSION SUBMITTED TO THE AUTHORITIES OR
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THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH THEY ARE GRANTED OR DENIED. THE IMPRESSION OF USG OFFICIALS IS THAT THERE ARE FEW REQUESTS AND MOST OF THESE ARE HONORED.

F. THERE IS FREEDOM OF WORSHIP. ISLAM IS THE PREDOMINANT RELIGION, BUT NON-ISLAMIC RELIGIONS ARE PERMITTED PROVIDED THEIR ADHERENTS DO NOT ATTEMPT TO CONVERT MUSLIMS.

G. LABOR UNIONS EXIST BUT ARE MONITORED BY THE GOVERNMENT. THERE HAVE BEEN STRIKES IN RECENT YEARS, BUT NONE IN THE PAST YEAR.

H. IN SUMMARY, THE GOK IS A COMPARATIVELY LIBERAL STATE WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS, VIEWED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ITS VERY "TRADITIONAL" SOCIETY. EMBASSY BELIEVES THIS SITUATION WILL CONTINUE TO PREVAIL, AND THAT THERE IS REASON TO ANTICIPATE, IF NOT TO COUNT ON, INCREASING ATTENTION BY GOK TO SOUND HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN THE FUTURE.

I. GIVEN THE GENERALLY BENIGN POSITION OF THE GOK WITH RESPECT TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ITS CITIZENS, THERE IS NO REASON TO STRUCTURE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT SO AS TO ATTEMPT TO EFFECT CHANGES IN THIS SPHERE.

1. REF PARA 3.A.12: KUWAIT RECEIVES NO ECONOMIC OR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM ANY SOURCE. HOWEVER, NON-US PURCHASES NEGOTIATED BY THE GOK INCLUDE 175 CHIEFTAIN TANK (UK), AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF SA-6 AND FROG-7 MISSILES (USSR), 20 MIRAGE F1 AIRCRAFT (FR), 12 PUMA HELICOPTERS (IT) AND 24 GAZELLE (IT) HELICOPTERS.

12. REF PARA 3.A.13.F: NUMBER OF US MILITARY, US CIVILIANS AND LOCAL WAGE REPORT EMPLOYEES REQUIRED FOR MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES AS AUTHORIZED UNDER EXISTING STATUTES:

A. A TOTAL OF NINE (9) US MILITARY FOR FISCAL YEARS
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80, 81 AND 82. (REFER UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, JOINT MANPOWER PROGRAMS, ISSUED 20 MARCH 1978.) THESE PERSONNEL ARE SUPPLEMENTED ON A TEMPORARY BASIS BY US MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SPECIALISTS IN CONNECTION WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF FMS PROGRAM.
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